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Abstract 
 
The perpetual debate on RFID as a risk to privacy has lead to a variety of technical proposals for securing 
RFID data and encompasses, apart from general IT security measures, a number of RFID-specific 
“Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)”. Against the background of an imminent obligation to include 
privacy-enhancing mechanisms in the retail industry’s current RFID deployments, this contribution 
provides a critical review of the undesired side-effects of PETs on information systems and business 
processes. As our investigation shows, the practical impact includes increased hardware costs, reduced 
capabilities of the technology, and a range of process-related issues, e.g. in the context of password 
management and consumer benefits. We discuss the managerial implications for RFID implementation 
strategies and propose a set of alternative starting points for fostering the public acceptance of the 
technology. 
 
Keywords: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Retail, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies. 
 
Introduction 
 
Practical relevance of the contribution 
 
The technologies of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) enjoy an enormous interest at the current time, not only from 
the standpoint of research but also from corporate practice. Enterprises from diverse branches are hoping for solutions to a 
wide range of management problems through RFID, from simple increases in processing efficiency for the receipt and 
despatch of goods in distribution centres through to improvements in goods availability on the shelves and on to the struggle 
against shrinkage and product counterfeiting. However, over the past few years, concerns about the possible risks of using 
RFID have increasingly been voiced. 
The risks associated with RFID that are discussed in the public include both the direct impact of electromagnetic radiation 
on health, as well as indirect economic consequences such as the elimination of jobs through increasing automation (Duce 
2003). The most frequently voiced fear refers to the misuse of data generated by RFID, resulting in an undesirable intrusion 
into the privacy of individuals. Here, the fears of the general public extend from the analysis and evaluation of individual 
consumer behaviour to an omnipresent surveillance through the “privacy snatchers” (Bibby 2006) in the form of transponder 
labels. The debate has become additionally heated through the actions and campaigns of pressure groups such as the 
American Association “Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN)” and similar 
European organisations. For example, the well-publicised “Big Brother Award” given to the Metro Group, along with a 
demonstration on the 28th of February 2004 in front of the Metro Future Store in Rheinberg, caused them to ultimately 
withdraw the RFID-based customer cards that were in circulation at the time (Albrecht and McIntyre 2005). Further 
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examples in Europe and the US, such as CASPIAN's call for a boycott of Gillette products because of tests with RFID 
transponders in razor blade packages, show that these are not isolated incidents. 
On the level of European policy-making, the debate has so far culminated in an online consultation conducted by the 
European Commission between July and September 2006. 2190 respondents answered questions about RFID use, privacy, 
standardisation, frequency spectrum, and other related issues. One of the interesting results of the survey was that about two-
thirds of all respondents had the opinion that the best solution to eliminate or greatly reduce the concerns of security, data 
protection and privacy, which may arise from deploying applications of RFID technology, are the development of technical 
solutions allowing to disable RFID tags and/or awareness raising campaigns to educate consumers. Almost half of all 
respondents had the opinion that “Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)” should be made mandatory in RFID 
applications. 61 % of the respondents had the opinion that a RFID tag related to a product in a supermarket should be 
automatically de-activated at the point of sale. A removable sticker attached to the product itself and a so-called “proximity 
tag” with a very short reading distance were advocated by 46 % and 40 % of all respondents, respectively (EU 2006). 
 
Research question and structure 
 
Against the background of an imminent obligation to implement privacy-enhancing mechanisms, this contribution 
investigates the practical impact of PETs on the retail industry’s current RFID deployments. In contrast to previous works, 
we do not aim at evaluating the benefits for consumer privacy but rather the undesired side-effects of PETs on information 
systems and business processes. For this purpose, the remainder of the paper is organised as follows: First, we provide a short 
overview of RFID technology and privacy issues. Second, we present a review of the existing body of literature on PETs. In 
the following, we analyse the potential impact of PETs on processes in the retail supply chain. We then discuss the 
managerial implications that can be drawn from our findings. The paper closes with a summary and an outlook on further 
research. 
 
Background 
 
Radio Frequency Identification 
 
RFID is a technology for the automatic identification of physical objects by radio such as industrial containers, palettes, 
individual products and also people. The identification event takes place over transponders located in or on the respective 
objects, which can be addressed without physical contact, over the so-called "air interface", by the antenna on a scanner 
device. Typical areas of application for RFID lie, adjacent to classics such as animal identification or access control systems, 
above all in Supply Chain Management, where the technology makes possible simplified goods turnover, automatic stock 
control in the storeroom resp. on the sales floor, theft protection, product tracking etc. (Bose and Pal 2005).  
The reason for the recent rapid and escalating use of RFID lies primarily in advanced miniaturisation, maturity as well as 
in the constant price decline which makes the use of RFID economically viable in ever more areas of application (Sarma 
2001, Want 2004). Another trigger has been especially the activities of the Auto-ID Center, a project founded in 1999 at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in cooperation with numerous industrial sponsors, for the development of 
RFID Standards. The main result of the Auto-ID Center was the "Electronic Product Code (EPC)" (Sarma 2005), a 
worldwide unambiguous numbering scheme for the designation of arbitrary physical goods which should ensure the 
interoperability of the technology in supply chain wide applications. Since the termination of the Auto-ID Center in October 
2003 the EPC technology is being commercialised and further developed by EPCglobal Inc., a subsidiary of GS1, the 
industry organisation responsible for Barcode standardisation (Sarma 2005). In the following years, EPC became the 
technical foundation for the multiple RFID initiatives of large chain stores such as Wal-Mart and Metro, and also for 
industrial enterprises such as Novartis or the US Department of Defense. 
 
RFID as a threat to privacy 
 
The threat to privacy through the use of information technology has its origins in the ability to permanently save and link 
information about individuals (Culnan and Bies 2003, Perrin 2005, Spinello 1998). With RFID and similar technologies, yet 
another dimension to data acquisition has developed through (a) the temporal and spatial extension of data collection 
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activities, (b) the inability to recognise and reconstruct data collection, (c) the acquisition of new data types through real-time 
monitoring, (d) the ever decreasing transparency of reasons for acquiring data, and (e) the uncontrolled data access caused by 
extreme interconnectedness (Cas 2004, Langheinrich 2005). Thus, the use of ID tags, sensors and location systems leads to 
the disappearance of what Lessig (1999) calls “structural” or “architectural” barriers, i.e. economic factors that make privacy 
intrusions costly or unprofitable.  
In the case of RFID, the privacy-related problem arises particularly because of the globally unique identity of each good 
and the possible linkage with the owner. That facilitates, in principle, an automatic tracking of individual people (Juels 2005, 
Sarma et al. 2002). Weinberg (2005) differentiates between the following three privacy risks from RFID: First, RFID may 
allow for robust and pervasive profiling, incorporating data from personal belongings and documents that is added to an 
individual’s profile. Second, RFID can be used to locate objects and people in space, thus enabling automatic surveillance of 
an individual’s activities. Third, after reading RFID tag information, people or devices associated with the reader network can 
take actions based on their knowledge of an individual’s objects and profile. Even if the listener can’t make a connection 
between RFID data and personally identifying information, the action threat remains, e.g. in the form of price discrimination, 
the practice of charging each customer the maximum amount he or she is prepared to pay (Odlyzko 2003, Stajano 2005). 
 
Literature Review 
 
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for RFID 
 
The perpetual privacy debate has lead to a variety of technical proposals for securing RFID data and encompasses, apart 
from general IT security measures, a number of RFID-specific PETs. These prevent the uncontrolled reading of transponders, 
the manipulation of information saved in them as well as eavesdropping, i.e. the interception of data transmissions between 
transponders and readers. The following enumeration provides an overview and a classification of the approaches proposed in 
academic literature and standard specifications: 
• Physical shielding. The simplest protection from access to transponders by third parties is physical separation by means of 
a metal net or a foil sheet according to a Faraday Cage (Kumar 2003). Various examples of this PET have been 
commercialised in the form of so-called “RFID foiling kits” and “RFID protection cases”, e.g. by privacy activist groups 
such as the German “Verein zur Förderung des öffentlichen bewegten und unbewegten Datenverkehrs e.V (FoeBuD)” 
(Association for the Promotion of Public Mobile and Immobile Data Traffic). While physical shielding is a simple form of 
protection for RFID-equipped passports and other small items, it is evidently unsuitable for most other products such as 
clothing, watches etc. 
• Physical destruction. An easy way of protecting consumers from RFID misuse is to remove or to destroy the transponder 
after purchase. For this purpose, Karjoth and Moskowitz (2005) propose the use of “clipped tags” that permit the 
customer to disable a tag by mechanically altering it. Possible realisations of clipped tags include tags with removable 
electrical conductors (e.g. conductors made of scratch-off material), perforations that separate the antenna from the 
microchip, and tags whose antenna is affixed to a removable peel-off layer. In contrast to electronic PETs, clipped tags 
provide immediate visual confirmation that the tag has been deactivated. 
• Blocking. Another means to prevent any communication between transponders and readers in reach is the use of jammer 
transmitters (Kumar 2003) that completely block a particular frequency band. A more sophisticated procedure is the use of 
“blocker tags” proposed by Juels et al. (2003), i.e. tags that positively respond to any request from a reader device. Thus, 
blocker tags circumvent the reader’s anti-collision protocol and keep it from identifying transponders in its environment. 
Furthermore, the authors suggest to implement a programmable “privacy bit” in transponders that allows for distinguishing 
between private tags that are protected by the blocker tag, and public tags that are accessable anytime. “Soft blocking” 
(Juels and Brainard 2004) is an alternative, lightweight approach that bases on blocker tags that resemble ordinary RFID 
tags whose only special distinction is a special tag identifier. In soft blocking, a reader would begin a scan by checking for 
tags with this identifier and refrains from scanning if it finds one. It is understood that soft blocking relies on RFID readers 
that are equipped with blocker-compliant firmware. 
• Proxying. The concept of proxying relies on privacy-enforcing devices carried by consumers in the form of distinctive 
items or integrated into mobile phones. Floerkemeier, Schneider and Langheinrich (2004) propose a prototype 
“Watchdog Tag” that monitors RFID scanning operations and collects information from readers, e.g. on their privacy 
policies. The device does not keep the readers from accessing tags but rather records information on tag access operations. 
Rieback, Crisp, and Tanenbaum (2005) propose a similar device, called “RFID Guardian”. The Guardian acts as a RFID 
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firewall that implements various privacy policies and intermediates reader requests to tags. Tags that the user wants to hide 
from readers are selectively jammed. 
• Tag anonymisation. Various concepts have been developed for anonymising tags after purchase in order to prevent 
tracking of items by third parties beyond the point of sale. Sarma et al. (2002) propose the idea of effacing unique 
identifiers in tags to address the tracking problem, but retaining product-type identifiers (i.e. traditional barcode data) for 
later use. Inoue and Yasuura (2003) suggest that consumers be equipped to relabel tags with new identifiers, but that old 
tag identifiers remain subject to re-activation for later public uses. Weis et al. (2003) present a cryptography-based 
approach that can be used to lock the tag. In this scenario, a hash function generates a new ID code for the tag using a 
random key, which is also necessary to unlock the tag. As with the other previous concepts, hash-based access control does 
not prevent the tracking threat since the tag still sends a static ID upon request. For this reason, the authors also propose a 
more complex algorithm that requires tags with random generators: Tags respond to reader queries by generating a random 
value r, then hashing its ID concatenated with r, and sending both values to the reader. A legitimate reader identifies one of 
its tags by performing a brute-force search of its known IDs, hashing each of them concatenated with r until it finds a 
match. Although impractical for retailers, this mode is feasible for owners of a relatively small number of tags. Juels 
(2004) proposes another approach with changing tag IDs that requires less logic on the tag. Instead of generating ID codes, 
each tag has a set of pseudonyms p1, p2, … pk that the tag is cycling through each time it’s read. The tag’s owner would 
have a list of all the tag’s pseudonyms, and the tag could be identified whenever it was queried. However, attackers could 
repeatedly scan the same tag, thereby forcing it to cycle through all available pseudonyms. As a countermeasure, tags could 
throttle the queries they receive, e.g. a tag might release a new pseudonym only every five minutes. Juels and Pappu 
(2003) propose a re-encryption concept specifically designed for banknotes. In their scheme, banknote tag serial numbers 
are encrypted with a law-enforcement public key. The resulting ciphertexts undergo periodic re-encryption to render 
multiple appearances of a given RFID tag unlinkable. Because of the severely restricted computing resources of RFID tags, 
they propose that re-encryption be performed by external computing agents, for example, publicly provided privacy-
enhancing stations in stores. Feldhofer et al. (2004) propose an authentication mechanism based on a simple two-way 
challenge-response algorithm, i.e. symmetric key encryption. The problem with this approach is that it requires to have 
AES implemented in an RFID tag. 
• Tag deactivation. In contrast to physical destruction, some authors have proposed mechanisms for deactivating the 
transponder IC permanently or temporarily. The best-known example of this category of PETs is the so-called “kill 
command” as it was specified in EPCglobals’s “EPC Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC Gen2)” standard (EPCglobal 2005).
Gen2 Tags deactivate themselves upon receiving the kill command code which must be accompanied by a 32 bit security 
code. In order to avoid the disadvantages of tag deactivation, Spiekermann and Berthold (2004) propose a password-
based model. In their scheme, the user puts the tag into sleep by sending a disable command and a password which could 
be automatically generated at the point of sale and printed on the customer’s receipt. In the following, the tag does not 
respond to reader queries anymore until it receives the corresponding enable command and the right password. Engberg et 
al. (2004) suggest a similar, but more complex algorithm: Their “zero knowledge authentication” approach is based on a 
shared key that is necessary to access the tag. The tag does not require a random generator, but it has to store the timestamp 
of the last query; furthermore, all reader devices must be synchronized. 
• Bug-safe RF protocols. A further PET category sets the focus on eavesdropping attacks. This attack model makes use of 
the fact that legitimate readers must operate at power levels that not only transmit information (i.e., commands) to the tags, 
but also supply enough energy to the tag to process and reply these commands. Thus, a third party might simply overhear 
the signals being sent back from a tag to a legitimate reader, without itself having to be close (or powerful) enough to 
actually power the tag. Against this background, Weis et al. (2003) propose a secure anti-collision protocol which 
guarantees that readers never transmit entire ID codes during the tag singulation phase. Based on the works by Rivest 
(1998), the authors also suggest a second procedure based on broadcasting of “chaff” commands, i.e. commands from the 
reader, intended to confuse or dilute information collected by eavesdroppers. By negotiating a shared secret, these 
commands could be filtered by tags. In order to keep distant readers from accessing tags, Fishkin and Roy (2003) propose 
an antenna-energy analysis procedure. In this scenario, tags measure the signal-to-noise ratio of the data received from a 
reader which gives a rough indication of read distance. When apparently scanned at a distance, tags might either release 
partial information or refuse to respond to queries. 
 
Summary of side-effects 
 
RFID components for use in the retail supply chain have been optimized for low cost, long range, and high identification 
speeds. Tags should ideally cost a few cents only, have a range of a few meters, and hundreds of tags should be identified per 
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second (Sarma 2005). However, the PET concepts presented in the previous subsection impact these performance indicators 
(cf. Table 1): 
• Identification speed. To reduce the overall cost of an RFID system, RFID tags used in retail logistics operate without a 
battery. The RFID tags are powered by the electric and/or magnetic field generated by the RFID reader. The result is that 
these “passive” RFID tags frequently loose power as they are moving past a reader. To address this characteristic of long 
range, passive RFID systems, RFID communication protocols, such as EPC Gen2, use very short data packets during the 
identification phase. This permits the successful identification of the tags even when they are only powered for a few 
hundred microseconds. In contrast to that, at low clock frequencies as can be found on RFID transponders, the AES 
encryption of a single 128 bit string, for instance, would take as long as ten milliseconds (Feldhofer et al. 2004). 
Cryptography-based PETs that rely on the exchange of long data packets and time-intensive computations will thus result 
in significantly reduced identification speeds. The same holds to a smaller extent for the use of proxies due to the 
additional overhead required for communication between the proxy device and the RFID reader. 
• Read/write range. Due to the low signal-to-noise ratio characteristic for long range RFID systems, there is also the 
disadvantage that long data packets are more likely to be corrupted by transmission errors. In a worst case scenario, tags 
might not be identified at all, e.g. as they move collectively past an RFID reader on a conveyor belt. The PETs using 
cryptographic function also require additional power to carry out the computations. While there are some very low power 
implementations available (e.g. Feldhofer et al. 2004), these still require as much power even at  low clock frequencies of 
100 kHz as the overall power consumption of a standard UHF RFID chip (Karthaus and Fischer 2003). The maximum 
operating range is thus significantly reduced. 
• Chip cost. To decrease the RFID tag cost even further, the microchip of the RFID tag should be as small as possible to 
reduce semiconductor manufacturing costs (Sarma 2001). Cryptographic functions implemented on the RFID microchip to 
increase the silicon footprint, however. Even the tiny AES implementation by Feldhofer et al. (2004) requires an additional 
3400 gates. This corresponds roughly to 20% increase in chip area of a conventional UHF microchip (Glidden  2004) and 
thus to a 20% increase in semiconductor manufacturing cost.  
• Label cost. The cost of the RFID tag does not only depend on the microchip cost, but also on the tag antenna cost and the 
cost of attaching the tag to the product. Additional antenna features such as the perforation needed to physically disable the 
tag as proposed by Karjoth and Moskowitz (2005) will thus increase the antenna manufacturing cost. This kind of 
“clipped” tags can also no longer be embedded in conventional packagings, which would increase the integration cost even 
further.  
• Tag functionality. Some PET schemes not only prevent undesired data collection by third parties but rather render 
impossible other applications as well by deleting parts of the tag’s memory or by permanently deactivating the tag entirely. 
The same problem can arise in the case of blocking or proxying devices that prevent any access to the tag regardless of its 
purpose.  
• Key management. Schemes that rely on secret passwords or codes stored on the RFID tags, e.g. to authenticate a kill 
command, lead to significant system integration costs. A large retailer would need to keep a database with an individual 
password for each retail item sold to prevent the mass killing of RFID tags that carry a common password. Since the tags 
are attached to the products by the manufacturer and not the retailer, who has to eventually disable the tag, any of the 
password-based PETs mandate significant efforts for data exchange among supply chain partners.  
• Device cost. Shielding, blocking, proxying, and password-based approaches that require an additional device to safeguard 
the privacy of the individual also lead to increased hardware cost. However, these additional devices will not necessarily be 
provided by the retailers, but privacy-concerned individuals will have to purchase the devices themselves. Additional cost 
is also to be expected for RFID readers that implement more complex protocols and privacy policies. 
 
Impact analysis 
 
The current use of RFID in the retail supply chain is most of all focused on the tagging of logistical units, i.e. pallets and 
cases, but some first examples of RFID-equipped sales units can be found as well (apparel, cosmetics, drugs etc.). Since 
privacy-related issues only arise in the latter case, we restrict ourselves to a consideration of the relevant business processes 
with item-level tagging. Detailed depictions of RFID applications in retail were given e.g. by Agarval (2001), Chappell et al. 
(2002), Kärkäinnen (2003), Loebbecke (2005), and Tellkamp et al. (2004). 
Consumer products are tagged in the manufacturing process itself or at a later stage of the supply chain which allows for 
the automatic tracking of deliveries to the stores. Depending on the respective structure of the logistical network, a sequence 
of intermediate transport and warehouse management tasks are conducted by the CPG manufacturer, the retailer, a wholesaler 
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or a logistics service provider. These processes usually comprise a broad range of identification events for inbound and 
outbound deliveries as well as inventories in distribution centres. Furthermore, RFID is also used in the stores in order to 
improve shelf replenishment processes and to enable product information kiosks, digital shopping assistants, and faster 
check-outs at the point of sale. This is also where consumers are first confronted with RFID. If the RFID tag is not removed 
at the POS, it remains part of the product over its entire life-cycle. This includes everyday usage of the item as well as after-
sales services of the retailer or the manufacturer, e.g. maintenance and repair, warranty claims, or product exchange.  
 
Table 1. Negative side-effects of PET concepts on RFID systems: × = categorical, (×) = conditional 
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Physical shielding Kumar 2003  (×)  × 
Physical destruction Karjoth and Moskowitz 2005  × (×)   
Kumar 2003  (×)  × 
Juels et al. 2003  (×)  × 
Blocking 
Juels and Brainard 2004 (×)    (×)  × 
Floerkemeier et al. 2004 (×)      × Proxying 
Riebeck et al. 2005 × ×
Sarma et al. 2002  (×)  ×   
Inoue and Yasuura 2003  (×)   × (×) 
Weis et al. 2003 × × × (×) 
Juels 2004 (×)  ×   × (×) 
Juels and Pappu 2003 × × × × (×) 
Tag anonymisation 
Feldhofer et al. 2004 × × × ×
EPCglobal 2004  × (×)  × ×  
Spiekermann and Berthold 2004  × (×)   × (×) 
Tag deactivation 
Engberg et al. 2004 × (×)   × (×) 
Weis et al. 2003 (×)  (×)     
Rivest 1998 ×
Bug-safe RF protocols 
Fishkin and Roy 2003  × ×
Table 2 provides an overview of the relevance of PET side-effects to these processes. According to the differing nature of 
their impacts from an economic perspective, the before-mentioned side-effects can be grouped into the following categories: 
• Technology cost. The first and most evident consequence of PET side-effects is the higher cost of hardware components 
owing to the increased complexity of protocols and tag designs. This problem mostly affects semiconductor and label 
manufacturers whose market is traditionally very price-sensitive which has its root cause in the low margins of most 
consumer goods. The same applies to a smaller extent to reader manufacturers who would have to implement PET 
mechanisms in their products as well. Higher hardware costs are eventually shifted on to the CPG manufacturers which 
influences their and the retailers’ ROI calculations depending on the existence of cost sharing agreements. 
• Data quality. The deterioration of RFID performance indicators (i.e. identification speed and read/write range) leads to 
higher process costs along the supply chain because of worsened identification rates. Cryptography-based mechanisms, for 
example, result in an increase in energy demand of the RFID tag which conflicts with existing legal regulations regarding 
electromagnetic radiation. The read/write range of RFID would thus decrease significantly. European companies would be 
affected by this in particular since ETSI regulations in the EU are more restrictive than their FCC counterparts in the US 
(ITU 2005). A similar issue is the achievable read rate which is mostly determined by the technology’s identification 
speed. Under real-world conditions, RFID read rates can reach more than 99% for many product categories, but drop below 
30% for goods that contain substantial portions of water or metal (GS1 2005). PET mechanisms, which increase the 
complexity of RFID protocols in general, further reduce the number of items that can be identified per time unit. Both 
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effects are eventually reflected in insufficient data quality which partly eliminates the desired process savings and changes 
cost/benefits ratios of RFID in comparison to the barcode, e.g. because of inventory inaccuracies or undetected shrinkage. 
• System integration. The management of password data among supply chain partners still poses a widely unsolved problem. 
PET mechanisms that allow for tag deactivation or anonymisation would have to be secured by keys in the very moment 
when the tag is attached to the product in order to make sure that tags cannot be deactivated or manipulated by 
unauthorised third parties. These keys must then be forwarded to all following stages in the supply chain which requires 
substantial system integration efforts that might even surpass the complexity of today’s EDI deployments. On the one 
hand, this is owing to the sheer mass of password data that would be generated for billions of consumer products. On the 
other hand, the large number of partners and their interrelations in retail supply chains increase the complexity of interfaces 
and data exchange formats. 
• Consumer convenience. PET mechanisms that impact the tag’s functionality after purchase have an impact on virtually all 
after-sales services that rely on unique object identification. As a consequence, most product-related benefits from RFID 
for the consumer could not be realised. This disadvantage could be avoided by tag anonymisation concepts which allow for 
reactivating the tag. However, tag anonymisation imposes on consumers to buy and use a personal device for tag 
communication and key management, i.e. they become responsible for managing privacy on their own. A simpler – but 
nevertheless troublesome – alternative would be to give customers the opportunity to manually destroy tags or to shield 
their property using special shopping bags. 
 
Table 2. The economic impact of PET side-effects on retail processes  
(TC = Technology cost, DQ = Data quality, SI = System integration, CC = Consumer convenience) 
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CPG manufacturing  TC TC  SI  
Transport logistics DQ DQ    SI  
Warehouse management DQ DQ    SI  
In-store logistics DQ DQ    SI  
Check-out DQ DQ    SI CC 
After-sales services  CC CC CC 
Discussion 
 
The managerial implications that can be drawn from our analysis are twofold. First, it is evident that the decision to 
implement a particular PET can have a substantial negative impact on technical capabilities of hardware components, ROI 
calculations and an organisation’s RFID strategy as a whole. Some of the mechanisms described before can immediately be 
regarded as not viable, because they are simply impractical. This is a result of excessively high technical requirements, 
significant complexity for the user or for the fact that various RFID applications are rendered impossible in advance. The 
need for managing passwords, hash values, etc. along the entire supply chain is an additional drawback of many approaches 
which poses a barrier to rapid adoption. Furthermore, a second aspect that may prove even more important is the question of 
consumer perceptions of PETs. Most of the solutions pass on to the consumer the organisational effort for privacy protection, 
similar to an opt-out procedure through the technology. However, the additional security acquired is neither visible nor 
perceptible and, even worse, reliable verification is impossible. As de Jager (2005) puts it regarding the EPC Kill Command:  
“Kill technology doesn’t work. You can’t kill the image of the RFID chip that’s in my head. [...] Kill technology is a dead 
end because it solves the wrong problem. The problem is trust. There is a good way to kill an RFID chip: Throw it in a 
microwave and wait until you see the sparks. [...] When I see the fireworks inside my microwave, I know that tag is dead.”  
In contrast to other everyday technical safety mechanisms, for example the brakes of a car, which do not presuppose trust, 
but rather create it, all mentioned PETs that include no physical destruction of the tag do not provide the user with a direct 
"look & feel" experience (Juels 2006). As Günther and Spiekermann (2005) found from an analysis of consumer perceptions, 
“regardless of privacy-enhancing technology employed, consumers feel helpless toward the RFID environment, viewing the 
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network as ultimately more powerful than they can ever be”. Therefore, despite the clear need for additional and ongoing 
technological development, the objective of achieving an improved acceptance of technology cannot be achieved through 
such measures alone. 
This view is also supported by several findings from IS research on the acceptance of information and communication 
technologies. From this perspective, the implementation of RFID-related PETs can be interpreted as an attempt to foster so-
called “technology trust”, i.e. trust in an IT infrastructure based on technical safeguards and protective measures (Knights et 
al. 2001, Ratnasingham and Pavlou 2002). Pavlou (2001), for instance, demonstrated that trust influences the perceptions of 
risk which has a direct impact on intentions to use a particular technology. However, technology trust is only one out of 
various other antecedents of technology acceptance. The concept of institutional trust, for example, refers to the security one 
feels about a situation because of guarantees, regulations, safety nets or other structures (Shapiro 1987, McKnight et al. 1998, 
Gefen et al. 2003), e.g. through self-regulation or the involvement in the official statutory process. Interpersonal trust, again, 
refers to the relation between the trustor and the the specific other individual (or party) that one trusts (McKnight and 
Chervany 2002). One option for the development of interpersonal trust is to formulate processes in such a way that customers 
gain the impression of “procedural fairness”, that is, an appropriate handling of business activities (Culnan and Armstrong 
1999). Aside from trust concepts, perceptions of long-term usefulness and ease of use of technical artefacts are also known to 
have a significant influence on the acceptance of new technologies (Davis 1989). 
As a consequence, companies involved in RFID deployments should develop privacy strategies beyond the present 
predominantly technology-oriented perceptive. An open dialogue with customers, for example, plays an important role in 
gaining or regaining confidence and credibility. Another instrument is the formulation of clear and for all sides obligatory 
rules, e.g. in the form of EPCglobal’s “Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products”. Furthermore, improved processes can 
increase customer acceptance of technology through additional services and benefits (Eckfeldt, 2005). Various surveys e.g. 
indicate a readiness by consumers to accept RFID in connection with improved product security, faster checkouts or easier 
returns (Gartner 2003, CGEY 2004). 
 
Summary and Outlook 
 
The public debate on RFID and privacy is currently moving itself in the classical constellation of enterprises vs. NGOs. In 
this phase the stakeholders are still in a position to exert influence in how aspects come to fruition, as conflict intensifying or 
conflict extenuating. Manufacturing and retailing have won some time through the withdrawal from several critical areas of 
application and the decision not to apply RFID at the individual product level in the first step, but only to logistical units. 
However, with the further development of the technology and, at the same time, sinking prices, over time a number of 
applications are likely to become economically viable which entail transponders in individual products that will remain 
activated beyond purchase.  
At this point in time at the latest, RFID suppliers and users will have to deal with the possibilities and drawbacks of PET 
concepts. As our investigation has shown, their practical impact on retail processes can be severe. Particularly the negative 
influence on bulk readings and read/write ranges of many proposals could endanger the attractiveness of RFID technology. 
Increasing cost of hardware components and system integration is a further threat that could easily make the rationale for 
replacing barcodes with RFID tags obsolete. Not least, the positive impact on consumer perceptions of RFID seems highly 
questionable. In this regard, it is surprisingly most of all the cheapest and simplest PET concepts (i.e. physical shielding and 
destruction) that look more promising than the complex ones. 
Our contribution could be a starting point for further research in various directions. First, more empirical research will be 
necessary in order to get a better understanding of public perceptions of RFID and privacy risks. Second, current research on 
PET concepts should put more emphasis on user acceptance studies and quantifications of their economic impact. A third 
opportunity could be the development and evaluation of RFID consumer applications in retail environments. 
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